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This paper selectively surveys the recent literature on price discrimination. The fo-
cus is on three aspects of pricing decisions: the information about customers available
to ﬁrms; the instruments ﬁrms can use in the design of their tariﬀs; and the ability of
ﬁrms to commit to their pricing plans. Developments in marketing technology mean
that ﬁrms often have access to more information about individual customers than was
previously the case. The use of this information might be restricted by public policy
towards customer privacy. Where it is not restricted, ﬁrms may be unable to commit
to the use they make of the information. With monopoly supply, an increased abil-
ity to engage in price discrimination will boost proﬁt unless the ﬁrm cannot commit
to its pricing policy. With competition, the eﬀects of price discrimination on proﬁt,
consumer surplus and overall welfare depend on the kinds of information and/or in-
struments available to ﬁrms. The paper investigates the circumstances in which price
discrimination causes all prices (and hence proﬁt) to fall.
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Chen, Drew Fudenberg, Ken Hendricks, Marco Ottaviani, Barry Nalebuﬀ, Pierre Regibeau, Patrick Rey,
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11 Introduction
This paper surveys, in a highly selective manner, the recent progress which has been made
in the economic understanding of price discrimination. One can say that price discrimina-
tion exists when two “similar” products with the same marginal cost are sold by a ﬁrm at
diﬀerent prices.1 There are many forms of price discrimination, including: charging diﬀerent
consumers diﬀerent prices for the same good (third-degree price discrimination); making
the marginal price depend on the number of units purchased (nonlinear pricing); making
the marginal price depend on whether other products are also purchased from the same
ﬁrm (bundling); making the price depend on whether this is the ﬁrst time a consumer has
purchased from the ﬁrm (introductory oﬀers; customer “poaching”).
In broad terms, this paper is about what happens to proﬁt and consumer surplus when
ﬁrms use more ornate tariﬀs to sell their products. There are two reasons why a ﬁrm might
be able to tune its tariﬀ more ﬁnely: it might obtain higher quality information about its
potential customers, or it might be able to use additional instruments in its tariﬀ design.
A ﬁrm can become better informed about its potential customers if it purchases cus-
tomer data from a marketing company or from another ﬁrm. It can use this data to send
personalized price oﬀers to new customers (an example of third-degree price discrimina-
tion).2 Alternatively, a ﬁrm might keep records of its customers’ past purchases, and use
this information to update its future price oﬀers to those customers. Firms’ access to better
information is aﬀected by public policy towards consumer privacy (for instance, whether
ﬁrms are permitted to pass information about their customers to other ﬁrms). It is also
aﬀected by a consumer’s ability to become “anonymous” when dealing with ﬁrms, and to
pretend to be a new customer.
Examples of the use of more instruments include: using two-part tariﬀs instead of linear
prices; charging diﬀerent identiﬁable consumer groups diﬀerent prices instead of a common
price; oﬀering a discount if two products are jointly purchased; or making the price for an
item depend on whether a customer has previously purchased similar items from the ﬁrm.3
Public policy towards price discrimination aﬀects the range of instruments which ﬁrms can
1Stigler (1987) suggests a deﬁnition that applies to a wider class of cases: discrimination exists when two
similar products are sold at prices that are in diﬀerent ratios to their marginal costs. (This deﬁnition makes
more sense when discussing “versioning”, where slightly diﬀerent versions of a product–such as hardback
and paperback books–are oﬀered for sale at very diﬀerent prices.) Which of these deﬁnitions we use makes
no diﬀerence for the purposes of this paper. An alternative deﬁnition might be that price discrimination is
present when a similar product is sold to diﬀerent consumers at diﬀerent prices. However, this deﬁnition
rules out cases of “intra-personal” discrimination which are sometimes relevant.
2See Taylor (2004, section 1) for a summary of the market for customer information. For instance, he
reports that a good customer mailing list can sell for millions of dollars on its own.
3Pure bundling–where two products are made available only as a joint purchase–is not a more ornate
tariﬀ compared to separable prices, but rather just a diﬀerent kind of tariﬀ. However, mixed bundling, where
individual products as well as the bundle are oﬀered for sale, is a more ornate tariﬀ compared to either pure
bundling or separable prices.
2use. Firms are also constrained in the range of instruments they can use by the possibility
of arbitrage and resale between consumers.4
With monopoly supply, except for issues to do with commitment problems (see sections
2.2 and 2.3 below), the use of more ornate tariﬀs must lead to higher proﬁts. When the
ﬁrm has access to more detailed information about its customers or can use a wider range of
instruments in its tariﬀ, it can do no worse than before and generally it can do better. With
competition, though, the eﬀects of using more ornate tariﬀs are less clear cut. In particular,
in section 3 a Hotelling example is used to argue that the impact of more information on
proﬁts and prices depends crucially on the kind of information which is available. Some
information will cause ﬁrms to make higher proﬁts in equilibrium, whereas other kinds of
information will cause all prices to fall compared to the situation with uniform pricing.
Similarly, the availability of an additional tariﬀ instrument has ambiguous eﬀects on
proﬁt and consumer surplus (see section 4). Competing multiproduct ﬁrms often make less
proﬁt when they practice mixed bundling than when they sell their products separately. In
contrast, when consumers buy all relevant products from one ﬁrm (i.e., in a one-stop shopping
framework), when consumers are homogenous the eﬀect of more ornate tariﬀs in competitive
markets is to boost proﬁt and to harm consumers. Price discrimination also allows a ﬁrm
to target price reductions more accurately at market segments where competition is most
intense. Doing so can harm rivals and deter entry, and as such can harm consumers compared
to the case where discrimination is banned.
A third theme of the paper, in addition to the eﬀects of more information and instruments,
is how the ability of ﬁrms to commit to their pricing plans aﬀects industry outcomes. In
a dynamic context, it is well known that a monopolist’s ability to commit to future prices
aﬀects its proﬁt. Advances in marketing may mean that the commitment problem has
become more severe. The ﬁnely-tuned customer data which ﬁrms often possess permits the
use of personalized prices. Such prices are often “secret” rather than public and, as such, it
is unlikely that ﬁrms will be able to commit to such prices. In both monopoly and oligopoly
settings, we will see that when ﬁrms can commit to price plans (or when they cannot engage
in behaviour-based price discrimination, which often amounts to the same thing), this will
increase industry proﬁt and harm consumers.
The welfare eﬀects of allowing price discrimination (or more ornate tariﬀs) is ambiguous,
both with monopoly and with oligopoly supply. There is no justiﬁcation for public policies
that prohibit price discrimination in general. Price discrimination can lead to eﬃcient pric-
ing, for instance (see section 2.1). Price discrimination can lead to more intense competition
which beneﬁts consumers (see sections 3.3 and 4.2). When ﬁrms have diﬃculty committing
to prices, they often are forced to charge low prices. In such situations, a policy which
forbids discrimination can act to restore commitment power, to the detriment of consumers
(sections 2.2 and 2.3). In dynamic settings, the eﬀect of price discrimination on consumer
4European competition law forbids dominant ﬁrms from preventing arbitrage (or “parallel imports”)
between countries. See Motta (2004), for instance.
3welfare may depend upon whether consumers are sophisticated or naive (see section 2.2).
When ﬁrms oﬀer diﬀerent prices to their loyal customers and to their rival’s previous cus-
tomers this can make competition more intense, but it can also induce excessive switching
between ﬁrms (section 5). By contrast, multiproduct ﬁrms might induce excessive loyalty,
or one-stop shopping, by means of bundling discounts (section 4.2). Discrimination can also
lead ﬁrms to leave consumers with less surplus than they would enjoy in its absence (sections
3.2 and 4.1). In addition, the freedom of an incumbent ﬁrm to engage in price discrimina-
tion will typically have an discouraging eﬀect on entry (section 4.3). Sensible policy towards
price discrimination needs to be founded on good economic understanding of the market in
question.
2 Monopoly supply
2.1 Information and Instruments
In many cases, the welfare losses caused by ﬁrms exploiting market power are caused by the
ﬁrms having insuﬃcient information about their consumers’ preferences, or being constrained
in their ability to condition prices on their information about consumers. In some circum-
stances, allowing ﬁrms to engage in price discrimination can implement eﬃcient prices. In
these cases, welfare is unambiguously improved.
One familiar example of this is ﬁrst-degree discrimination, where a monopolist has perfect
information about each consumer’s valuation for its products and has the ability to set
personalized prices. To be concrete, suppose there is a population of consumers, each of
whom wishes to consume a unit of the ﬁrm’s product. A consumer’s valuation for this unit
is denoted v and this varies among consumers according to the distribution function F(v).
Suppose the ﬁrm has unit cost c. If price discrimination is not possible (e.g., because the
ﬁrm does not have the necessary information, cannot prevent arbitrage between consumers,
or is not permitted to engage in discrimination), the ﬁrm will choose a uniform price p to
maximize proﬁt (p − c)(1 − F(p)). Clearly, this uniform price will be above cost, and total
surplus is not maximized. (It is eﬃcient to serve those consumers with v ≥ c, but only those
with v ≥ p > c are served.) If the ﬁrm can observe each consumer’s v and is permitted
to discriminate on that basis, it will charge the type-v consumer p = v, provided this price
covers its cost of supply. In other words, an eﬃcient outcome is achieved. However, the ﬁrm
appropriates the entire gains from trade and consumers are left with nothing.
There are situations when price discrimination can lead to approximately eﬃcient prices,
even when the monopolist has relatively little information about consumer tastes.5 A su-
permarket, say, supplies a large number of products. Consumers have a wide variety of
preferences over these products–some people prefer tea to coﬀee, and so on. Suppose that
the supermarket sets the price of each item equal to its marginal cost of supply for that
5See Armstrong (1999) and Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999) for this analysis.
4item and also sets an entry fee (or annual fee) to get into the shop. In this case, provided
they come in at all, consumers will buy a product whenever it is eﬃcient for them to do
so. Suppose that consumer valuations for the various products are independently distrib-
uted product by product (so the fact a consumer likes coﬀee, say, gives no guidance about
whether she also likes potatoes). For a given list of prices, the “law of large numbers” implies
that each consumer’s total surplus is approximately the same, even though consumers diﬀer
signiﬁcantly in their individual purchases. Therefore, the ﬁrm can extract almost all this
total surplus without excluding many consumers. In these circumstances the ﬁrm can obtain
approximately the ﬁrst-best proﬁt level by setting its marginal prices equal to marginal costs
and extracting the resulting consumer surplus by means of a lump-sum fee.6 The key insight
is that a multiproduct ﬁrm can better predict a consumer’s total surplus than it can predict
a consumer’s surplus derived from any individual product. As in the previous example of
ﬁrst-degree price discrimination, the eﬃcient outcome is approximately achieved, and in the
case of monopoly the ﬁrm extracts almost all the gains from trade.
Monopoly ﬁrst-degree price discrimination is merely an extreme form of a fairly common
situation. Lack of information about consumer tastes (or an inability to set suitably ﬁnely-
tuned prices) in combination with market power leads to welfare losses as the ﬁrm faces
a trade-oﬀ between volume of demand and the proﬁt it makes from each consumer. In
many cases, if the ﬁrm obtains more detailed information about its consumers (or if it is
permitted to price discriminate when it was not previously) this will enable the ﬁrm to
extract consumer surplus more eﬃciently, and this will often lead to greater overall welfare.
However, it is consumers’ private information that protects them against giving up their
surplus to a monopoly. Therefore, there will often be a reduction in consumer surplus when
the monopoly ﬁrm obtains better information about its consumers.
Finally, in the context of regulated monopoly, socially optimal prices almost always exhibit
price discrimination.7 For instance, Ramsey prices–the set of linear prices which maximize
total welfare subject to the regulated ﬁrm covering its costs–depend on demand conditions
in much the same way as an unregulated monopolist’s prices do. For instance, when the
ﬁrm serves a number of independent markets, each with the same marginal cost of supply,
Ramsey principles suggest that the most eﬃcient way to cover the ﬁrm’s costs is to set a
higher price in those markets where consumer demand is less elastic, exactly as would be
the case with an unregulated proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrm. Permitting price discrimination will
surely improve welfare in such situations. The same point applies to the use of other tariﬀ
instruments, such as two-part tariﬀs and bundling.
6As emphasized by Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999), if marginal costs are zero (as with electronic distrib-
ution of software and other information), this proﬁt-maximizing outcome is implemented by pure bundling.
7Edgeworth (1910, page 462) writes “a regulated discrimination of prices, such as might conceivably be
practised by a Socialist Directory, but is not possible in a regime of competition, tends to increase the
sum-total of utility.”
52.2 Dynamic pricing
A topic which has received much recent attention is dynamic price discrimination.8 There
are many aspects to this phenomenon. A publisher sets a high price for a new (hardback)
book, then subsequently the price is reduced. Or a retailer might use information it has
obtained from its previous dealings with a customer to oﬀer that customer a special deal
(or, as we will see, sometimes a bad deal). This latter form of discrimination, sometimes
termed “behaviour-based price discrimination”, could be highly complex. If a supermarket
has suﬃcient information, it could oﬀer those customers who have purchased, say, nappies,
a voucher oﬀering discounts to a particular brand of baby food. Or if a customer regularly
spends £80 per shopping trip, the supermarket might send the customer a discount voucher if
he spends more than £100 next time. Or if the consumer appears to have starting shopping
elsewhere recently, the supermarket will send a generous discount voucher to attempt to
regain that consumer.9
In this section and in section 5 I will focus on simple forms of dynamic price discrimi-
nation. Specially, I will assume that consumers have unit demand for a single product per
period, and that there is no scope for ﬁrms to tailor their products to what they judge to be
a consumer’s particular tastes.10 I will focus on the case where ﬁrms are able, where policy
permits, to make their price depend on whether or not the consumer has already purchased
from the ﬁrm.
The reader might ask: what is the diﬀerence between dynamic discrimination and static
multi-product discrimination such as mixed bundling (which is discussed in section 4.2)?
There are two chief diﬀerences. First, unlike the static case, consumers might not know their
preferences for future consumption at the time of their initial dealings with a ﬁrm. Second,
ﬁrms might not be able to commit to their future price policy at the time of their initial
dealings with consumers. It is perhaps especially plausible that ﬁrms cannot commit when
they oﬀer personalized discounts (such as the supermarket examples just mentioned). In the
following discussion I will focus on this second aspect of the dynamic interaction.
In more detail, suppose a ﬁrm can sell its product over two periods. Suppose there is
a diverse population of consumers, each of whom potentially wishes to buy a single unit of
the product in each of the two periods. A consumer’s valuation of the unit, v, is uniformly
distributed on [0,1], and this valuation is the same in the two periods. Suppose the ﬁrm has
8See Fudenberg and Villas-Boas (2005) for a more detailed survey of this material, covering both monopoly
and oligopoly supply.
9Casinos also use dynamic pricing techniques. For instance, they monitor activity on their machines
and might oﬀer a someone a cash voucher if he has been “unlucky”, or they might set high room rates to
customers who have historically been unproﬁtable gamblers. See Christina Binkley, “Harrah’s uses science
to lure gamblers”, Wall Street Journal, 28 November 2004.
10For instance, someone might return to the same hairdresser since that hairdresser knows how best to cut
his/her hair. Or Amazon suggests new books that you might like, given your past purchases. See Acquisti
and Varian (2004) for a fuller account of the various ways in which a monopoly might use a customer’s
history to tailor its current deal.
6zero cost of production. Suppose the ﬁrm and consumers share the discount factor δ ≤ 1.
The ﬁrm chooses three prices: p1, the price for a unit in the ﬁrst period; p2, the price in the
second period if the consumer did not purchase in the ﬁrst period; and ˆ p2, the price for a unit
in the second period if the consumer also purchased in the ﬁrst period. In this framework
there are two forms of price discrimination possible: (i) the ﬁrm can base its second-period
price on whether the consumer purchased in the initial period (i.e., p2  = ˆ p2), or (ii) the ﬁrm
sets the same price the second period, but this common price is diﬀerent from the initial
price (p2  = p1). Case (i) might be termed “behaviour-based” discrimination, while case (ii)
could be termed “inter-temporal” discrimination.
Three distinct settings are discussed in this section: the case where consumers are sophis-
ticated and the ﬁrm can commit to its pricing plans; the case where consumers are “naive”
and do not foresee the ﬁrm may react strategically to their initial choices; and the case where
consumers are sophisticated but the ﬁrm cannot commit to its pricing plans.
Sophisticated consumers and commitment
Suppose the ﬁrm announces its three prices {p1,p2, ˆ p2} at the start of period 1 and the
ﬁrm cannot alter these prices in the light of a consumer’s ﬁrst-period decision. In this case,
the proﬁt-maximizing policy is to reproduce the optimal static policy over the two periods,
so that11




When the ﬁrm can commit to its second-period prices, it is optimal not to price discriminate
(in either sense).12 Clearly, this is also the outcome when the ﬁrm is unable to practice price
discrimination.
Naive consumers
Suppose next the consumers do not take into account the eﬀect that their initial pur-
chasing decision has on the second-period prices they will face.13 This framework might be
relevant for a new market, for instance, where consumers have not yet learned the ﬁrm’s
11See Hart and Tirole (1988) and Acquisti and Varian (2004). More generally, it is a standard result in
principal-agent theory that when the agent’s private information does not change over time, the optimal
dynamic incentive scheme simply repeats the optimal static incentive scheme. (For instance, see section 8.1
of Laﬀont and Martimort (2002) and the references therein.)
12If the model is modiﬁed so that either consumers have diﬀerent discount factors or consumers as a whole
have a diﬀerent discount factor to the ﬁrm, then it can be optimal to engage in price discrimination. In
addition, Crémer (1984) presents a model with commitment where the price declines over time. He supposes
that consumers, at the time of their ﬁrst purchase, are uncertain about their valuation for the product.
In this setting it is optimal to set the second-period price equal to marginal cost, since that maximizes a
consumer’s “option value” from future consumption. All the monopolist’s proﬁts are therefore extracted in
the ﬁrst period.
13Alternatively, we could think of consumers as simply being myopic. However, the stated “behavioural”
assumption seems more plausible.
7pricing strategy. If the ﬁrm chooses the ﬁrst-period price p1, naive consumers will purchase
in the ﬁrst period whenever v ≥ p1, in which case the ﬁrm makes proﬁt in the ﬁrst period
equal to p1(1 − p1). In the second period, the ﬁrm knows whether a consumer’s valuation
lies in the interval [0,p1), if the consumer did not purchase in period 1, or [p1,1], if the
consumer did purchase in period 1, and it will choose its second-period prices accordingly.
In the lower-value segment it will set the price p2 = 1
2p1, and in the high-value segment it
sets the higher price ˆ p2 = max{1
2,p1}. In particular, the ﬁrm views its previous customers as
its strong market in the second period, while new customers constitute the weak market.14
(This will continue to hold in oligopolistic settings in section 5.)
The static proﬁt-maximizing price in the ﬁrst period is p1 = 1
2. However, the ﬁrm will
wish to raise its price above this level, since this strategy renders its customer information
in the second period more valuable.15 If it chooses the initial price p1 ≥ 1
2, its discounted
proﬁt is
p1(1 − p1) + δ
 








and so the proﬁt-maximizing initial and subsequent prices are











Thus, consumers face an unchanged price in the second period if they purchase in the ﬁrst
period, while the oﬀered price is halved if they did not initially purchase. Here, discounted
consumer surplus is lower compared to when the ﬁrm cannot practice price discrimination.16
Sophisticated consumers and no commitment
When consumers are sophisticated, the price plan in (1) is not feasible when the ﬁrm
cannot commit to its future prices. Once those consumers with v ≥ 1
2 have purchased in the
ﬁrst period, the ﬁrm is left with an unidentiﬁable pool of low-value consumers. Given this,
in the second period the proﬁt-maximizing policy is to set p2 = 1
4 to those consumers who
have not already purchased. Sophisticated consumers foresee the ﬁrm will behave in this
opportunistic manner, and some consumers (with v slightly greater than 1
2) will strategically
delay their purchase to receive the discounted price in the next period.
We calculate the non-commitment policy as follows. Suppose that in the ﬁrst period the
ﬁrm chooses price p1. What must the time-consistent second-period prices be? Given p1,
suppose those consumers with value v ≥ v∗ choose to buy in the ﬁrst period, where the
14In the price discrimination literature, a market is said to be “strong” (“weak”) if a ﬁrm wishes to raise
(lower) its price there compared to the situation where it must charge a uniform price in the two markets.
15The period-1 price which generates the highest period-2 proﬁt is p1 = 2
3.






(δ + 1)/(3δ + 4)
2. This
is greater than the case without price discrimination, when prices are given by (1) and discounted consumer
surplus is 1
8(1 + δ).
8threshold v∗ is to be determined. The ﬁrm will optimally choose the second-period price for




The second-period price for those who did buy in the ﬁrst period depends on v∗: if v∗ < 1
2
then ˆ p2 = 1
2 whereas if v∗ > 1
2 then ˆ p2 = v∗. In either case, the consumer who is indiﬀerent
between buying in the ﬁrst period and buying only in the second period, v∗, satisﬁes
v
∗ − p1 = δ(v
∗ − p2) ,
and so from expression (3) v∗ = 2p1/(2 − δ). If v∗ ≥ 1
2 (as will happen in equilibrium) the


























Notice that p2 ≤ p1 ≤ 1
2 ≤ ˆ p2. Therefore, when the ﬁrm cannot commit to its future prices, it
will set a relatively low ﬁrst-period price (p1 ≤ 1
2), followed by a high second-period price for
those consumers who purchased in the ﬁrst period (ˆ p2 ≥ 1
2) and an even lower second-period
price aimed at those who did not purchase in the ﬁrst period (p2 ≤ p1). In this example, the
second-period price for those who previously purchased from the ﬁrm is exactly twice the
price for those consumers who did not already purchase.17 All consumers are better oﬀ when
the ﬁrm cannot commit, compared to the price plan (1), while the ﬁrm is obviously worse
oﬀ.18 Total welfare is also higher, despite the restricted consumption in the ﬁrst period and
the high price for repeated sales compared to the commitment regime.
The eﬀect of a ban on price discrimination in this case is to restore the ﬁrm’s commitment
power, to the detriment of all consumers. (By contrast, when the consumers are naive, a
ban on price discrimination will make consumers in aggregate better oﬀ.) All that is needed
to restore commitment power is to forbid behaviour-based discrimination, i.e., to require
p2 = ˆ p2. When second-period prices are constrained to be equal, a consumer has no incentive
to behave strategically in the ﬁrst period (i.e., he will buy if v ≥ p1), and the ﬁrm has no
incentive to lower the second-period price below the commitment level. If the ﬁrm could
17Of course, this form of discrimination is not feasible if past consumers can pretend to be new customers,
for instance by deleting their computer “cookies” or using another credit card when they deal with an online
retailer.
18With commitment prices (1), the total discounted payment for two units is (1 + δ)/2. With the no-
commitment prices (4), if a consumer buys two units the total discounted payment is less than (1 + δ)/2,
and so all consumers must be better oﬀ when the ﬁrm cannot commit.
9commit not to practice behaviour-based discrimination, for instance by being seen not to
invest in consumer tracking technology, its proﬁts would rise.19
Taylor (2004) analyzes a related model where one ﬁrm sells a product in period 1 and a
separate ﬁrm sells a related product in period 2.20 The ﬁrst ﬁrm is able to sell its information
about which consumers purchased from it in the ﬁrst period to the second ﬁrm. The second
ﬁrm is willing to pay for this information, since it provides the basis for behaviour-based price
discrimination towards its consumers. Since the ﬁrst ﬁrm can fully extract the second ﬁrm’s
beneﬁt from the information, the scenario is essentially the same as when an integrated
ﬁrm supplies in both periods and cannot commit to its second-period price. Taylor also
distinguishes between sophisticated and naive consumers. If consumers are naive, in the
sense that they do not foresee their decisions with one ﬁrm might aﬀect their oﬀers from the
subsequent ﬁrm, the ﬁrst ﬁrm has an incentive to raise its price above the monopoly level in
order to boost the value of information to the second ﬁrm (just as in expression (2) above).
Public policy towards privacy might prohibit the passing of consumer information between
ﬁrms, and this would make naive consumers better oﬀ and reduce the level of industry proﬁt.
On the other hand, when consumers are sophisticated, a ban on information transfer will
surely increase the industry proﬁts in this setting.
2.3 The “secret deals” problem
Suppose a vertically separated upstream monopolist sells an essential input, which has mar-
ginal cost c, to two competing downstream ﬁrms, A and B. For simplicity, suppose that
A and B supply an identical product and compete in a Cournot fashion, given the input
prices set by the upstream ﬁrm.21 Suppose that the contract between the monopolist and
downstream ﬁrm i takes the form of a two-part tariﬀ, with ﬁxed charge fi and per unit of
input price pi. First, note that by an appropriate choice of a non-discriminatory two-part
tariﬀ, the monopolist can ensure (i) that the industry proﬁt is maximized and (ii) that it
appropriates the entire industry proﬁt. (This is achieved by setting a high input price p, a
19Villas-Boas (2004) analyzes a related model with a inﬁnitely-lived ﬁrm facing a sequence of (sophisti-
cated) two-period consumers arranged in overlapping generations. The ﬁrm can makes its prices depend on
whether a consumer has previously purchased, but it cannot determine whether a new consumer is “young”
or whether she is “old” but chose not to consume in her ﬁrst period. An interesting result in this richer
framework is that there are cycles in the prices oﬀered to new consumers. In addition, as in the two-period
framework presented in the text, the ﬁrm is better oﬀ if it is unable to practice behaviour-based price
discrimination.
20In Taylor’s model consumer valuations are binary and are not perfectly correlated for the two products.
See Calzolari and Pavan (2005) for a related and more general model.
21The key papers relevant to this “secret deals” problem are Hart and Tirole (1990), O’Brien and Shaﬀer
(1992) and McAfee and Schwartz (1994). See Rey and Tirole (2005) for a fuller account of this literature.
In particular, the results reported are also valid when downstream ﬁrms supply diﬀerentiated products and
compete in prices, and when the monopolist oﬀers arbitrary nonlinear tariﬀs for its input.
10price above cost c, which generates high retail prices downstream, and then extracting the
downstream proﬁt via the ﬁxed charge f.) In many relevant cases, however, the fact that
the downstream ﬁrms are “big” customers implies that these contracts for input prices will
often be negotiated bilaterally rather than simply announced by the monopolist. In addition,
contracts for inputs are often much more detailed and speciﬁc than the simple prices in retail
markets. In such cases, it is plausible that each downstream ﬁrm’s contract with the monop-
olist will not be observed by the rival downstream ﬁrm. In this situation of “secret deals”
the monopolist ﬁnds it hard to avoid oﬀering each downstream ﬁrm a cost-based two-part
tariﬀ, with pi = c. Of course, if both A and B pay for the input at cost, then the industry
outcome will correspond to the (moderately competitive) Cournot outcome rather than the
industry proﬁt-maximizing outcome.
Why is the monopolist forced to set pi = c in this framework? Since it is secret, the choice
of contract between the monopolist and ﬁrm A, say, cannot aﬀect the expected output from
ﬁrm B (or its input choice). Therefore, the contract with A will maximize the combined
proﬁts of A and the monopolist, taking the contract with B as given. But the joint proﬁt-
maximizing contract will involve pA = c, since in that way the downstream ﬁrm’s incentives
are in line with the monopolist’s. A similar contract will be secretly agreed with ﬁrm B.
The monopolist’s market power is eroded by its inability not to negotiate eﬃcient bilateral
deals secretly with the downstream ﬁrms.
This eﬀect is closely related to the discussion in section 2.2 about a monopolist selling
to ﬁnal consumers which cannot commit to its future prices. In the dynamic context, the
monopolist cannot commit not to oﬀer a good deal to the remaining (low value) consumers
in the second period, and this acts to undermine its market power. Just as in that setting, a
ban on price discrimination in input prices will act to restore the monopolist’s market power.
If the monopolist were not allowed to oﬀer diﬀerent terms to diﬀerent downstream ﬁrms,
then it cannot secretly negotiate eﬃcient bilateral contracts, and it can then implement the
monopoly outcome. As in the dynamic pricing problem, then, a policy which prohibits price
discrimination will end up raising all prices and being detrimental to (ﬁnal) consumers.
3 The eﬀects of more information in oligopoly
The discussion to this point has focussed on monopoly, and argued that consumers are
protected from having their surplus extracted when (i) they possess private information
about their tastes and (ii) the ﬁrm is unable to commit to its pricing plans. Competition
between suppliers provides a third means by which consumers are protected against surplus
extraction. Even if ﬁrms know everything about a consumer’s tastes, competition ensures
that the consumer will still be left with positive surplus. In competitive environments,
whether consumers are better or worse oﬀ when ﬁrms obtain more detailed information
about them is a subtle question, as we will see in section 3. In general, when a ﬁxed set
of competing ﬁrms know everything about consumer tastes, (one) equilibrium necessarily
11involves the eﬃcient outcome.22
Much of the recent literature has focussed more on price discrimination in competitive
settings. Many of the extra eﬀects that can appear with competition can be illustrated using
a simple Hotelling duopoly example.23 Suppose two ﬁrms, A and B, compete in prices in a
symmetric Hotelling fashion. A consumer wishes to buy a single unit from either ﬁrm A or
ﬁrm B, and if he buys from ﬁrm i = A,B his net surplus is
u
i = v − p
i − td
i ,
where v is the consumer’s valuation for the unit (which is the same at either ﬁrm), pi is ﬁrm
i’s price, di is the distance the consumer travels to ﬁrm i, and t is the transport cost per
unit of distance faced by the consumer. The two ﬁrms are situated at each end of the unit
interval [0,1] and consumers are uniformly located along this interval. A consumer located
at x ∈ [0,1] is a distance dA = x from ﬁrm A and dB = 1 − x from ﬁrm B. A consumer’s
preferences in this framework are deﬁned by three parameters: v is the consumer’s valuation
for the product, x represents his relative preference for ﬁrm A over ﬁrm B, and t represents
his “choosiness”, i.e., how much he dislikes buying his less preferred brand. (The parameter
t might also represent a consumer’s “laziness”, and so a high t is closely related to having
high search costs.)
The parameters (v,x,t) are distributed among the consumers in some way. In the various
examples which follow, I will assume for simplicity that all consumers choose to buy from one
ﬁrm or the other. This assumption largely, but not entirely, eliminates the ability to compare
welfare with or without price discrimination, but it does hugely simplify the calculations. In
addition, I will assume that the parameters (v,x,t) are independently distributed. (I will in
the following sections suppose that each of the three parameters in turn is observable to the
ﬁrms, and I do not wish to consider whether observing v, say, allows ﬁrms to obtain a signal
about (x,t).) Suppose that production costs are normalised to zero. The consumer with
preferences (v,x,t) will buy from A rather than B if his surplus u is higher there. Since his
valuation of the product v is the same from either ﬁrm, he will choose to buy from the ﬁrm
with the lower total cost of purchase, and he will go to ﬁrm A if pA + xt ≤ pB + (1 − x)t.
22See Spulber (1979) for this analysis. Bernheim and Whinston (1986) provide related analysis in a more
general context. Also, notice that not all equilibria need be eﬃcient. Consider two ﬁrms which each supply
one of two perfectly complementary products. Suppose that consuming one unit of each product yields
utility 2 to the consumer, while consuming two units of each product yields utility 3. Suppose that costs
of production are zero for both ﬁrms. If both ﬁrms oﬀer the nonlinear tariﬀ such that p1 = 1 and p2 = 3
(where pi is the ﬁrm’s price for buying i units), the consumer will choose to buy one unit of each product,
which is ineﬃcient. Nevertheless, neither ﬁrm has a proﬁtable deviation. Bhaskar and To (2004) show in a
free entry model that, even when ﬁrms possess full information about the market and can use the full range
of tariﬀ instruments, there is a socially excessive number of ﬁrms in the market.
23A similar exercise was performed in the pioneering paper by Borenstein (1985). He analyzes a free
entry model rather than a duopoly, and so also considers the eﬀect of permitting price discrimination on
the equilibrium number of ﬁrms. He does not consider the eﬀect of discriminating on the basis of brand
preference.
123.1 Discriminating on valuation: proﬁt neutrality
Suppose that ﬁrms each observe a consumer’s valuation v and can target a personalized price
to that consumer. Does this information aﬀect prices and proﬁts in equilibrium? Clearly,
with monopoly supply the ability to observe valuations would be valuable–see section 2.1–
but in this particular competitive environment it actually has no eﬀect. For simplicity,
suppose that all consumers have the same choosiness parameter t.24 Given v, if the two
ﬁrms’ prices are pA and pB, a type-x consumer will buy from A when pA+tx ≤ pB+t(1−x),
i.e., when x ≤ 1
2 −
pA−pB












and it is straightforward to show that the equilibrium price in this segment is pA = pB = t.
Since the equilibrium price does not depend on v, whether or not v is observable has no
eﬀect on outcomes. Notice that this is true even in asymmetric cases: if ﬁrm B has no
information about v while A does, A has no incentive to use its superior information in its
pricing decisions. Therefore, a marketing ﬁrm with customer data about v would, in this
setting, be unable to sell this data to one or both duopolists.
This example extends to situations where consumers buy multiple units and multiple
products, and where consumers’ preferences over these various units is private informa-
tion.25 Suppose that a type-θ consumer obtains gross utility u(θ,q) if she buys the vector
of quantities q from a ﬁrm, excluding his transport cost and the price he must pay. The net
surplus obtained by a type-θ consumer located at x if he purchases quantities qA from ﬁrm
A in return for total payment PA is
u(θ,qA) − PA − tx ,
while his net surplus if he purchases qB from ﬁrm B in return for payment PB is
u(θ,qB) − PB − t(1 − x) .
Implicit in this formulation is the assumption that brand preferences (or transport costs)
do not depend on the quantities purchased. Suppose ﬁrst that ﬁrms can observe the type
θ of each consumer (but not the location x), and that θ is distributed independently from
the brand preference parameter x. Then the most proﬁtable way for a ﬁrm to attract a
24The argument works just as well when there is unobserved heterogeneity in t, provided that all consumers
participate.
25For this analysis see Armstrong and Vickers (2001, section 4) and Rochet and Stole (2002). This analysis
assumes that consumers purchase all products from a single ﬁrm and do not “mix-and match” across ﬁrms.
Rochet and Stole show that this “no discrimination” result is not robust to a number of changes to the
model, including: ﬁrms having diﬀerent costs; brand preference x being correlated with the vertical taste
parameter θ, or the total market size being aﬀected by the contracts oﬀered.
13consumer is to set its marginal prices equal to marginal costs and to extract proﬁt by means
of a lump sum charge. If each ﬁrm’s marginal cost for supplying product i is ci, each
ﬁrm will set marginal price pi ≡ ci and the ﬁxed charge t. This cost-based two-part tariﬀ
does not depend on θ. Therefore, this two-part tariﬀ remains an equilibrium even when
ﬁrms cannot observe the taste parameter θ.26 If ﬁrm B oﬀers the cost-based two-part tariﬀ
T(q) = t +
 
i ciqi, then the same tariﬀ is ﬁrm A’s best response if A does not observe θ
(since it is also A’s best response when it can observe θ).27
In sum, ﬁrms’ ability to observe “vertical” taste parameters (v or θ in the previous
discussions) has no eﬀect on outcomes in these models of competitive price discrimination.
3.2 Discriminating on choosiness: best-response symmetry
Now return to the unit demand Hotelling framework and suppose consumers diﬀer in their
choosiness parameter t. Suppose that t is distributed on the interval [tL,tH] according to
some probability distribution, and that location x is independently and uniformly distributed
on the unit interval [0,1]. Assume that tL > 0, so that no consumers view the ﬁrms’
services as perfect substitutes. If ﬁrms were able to observe t but not x, the equilibrium
price to the type-t consumers is just given by p(t) = t, as in section 3.1. This reveals a
major diﬀerence between discrimination based on choosiness t and based on valuation v:
in the latter case ﬁrms could not extract anything extra from high-value consumers due to
competitive pressure, but when a consumer is known to be choosy ﬁrms can extract high
proﬁt. Industry proﬁt when ﬁrms price discriminate in this way is
ΠT = E(t) , (5)
the expectation of t.
If ﬁrms cannot price discriminate, they will set uniform prices pA and pB. A type-(x,t)
consumer will buy from A at these prices if x ≤ 1
2 −
pA−pB
2t . When the two prices are not too







where ˆ t is the harmonic mean of t (so ˆ t = (E{1/t})
−1). Therefore, the equilibrium non-
26However, in general it may not be the only equilibrium.
27Miravete and Röller (2004) ﬁt a model of duopoly competition in nonlinear tariﬀs to data from cellular
telephone markets. (The model assumes that consumers buy services from both ﬁrms, in contrast to the
one-stop shopping framework used in the text.) They estimate that if ﬁrms were restricted to oﬀer two-part
tariﬀs rather than fully nonlinear tariﬀs, in equilibrium they would obtain 94% of the equilibrium proﬁts
with unrestricted tariﬀs.
28The condition for this to be the correct formula for A’s demand is that |pA − pB| < tL, so that no ﬁrm
has a monopoly over even the most price-sensitive of consumers.
14discriminatory price (and equilibrium industry proﬁt) is29
ΠND = pND = ˆ t . (6)
Since the harmonic mean is necessarily lower than the (arithmetic) mean, it follows
that industry proﬁts when ﬁrms can discriminate according to choosiness (5) are always
higher than those generated without such discrimination (6). Since total welfare is not
aﬀected by price discrimination in this full-participation framework, aggregate consumer
surplus decreases with this form of discrimination, although clearly the more price-sensitive
consumers are better-oﬀ with discrimination.30
In this example a ﬁrm will raise some prices and lower others if it is permitted to engage
in price discrimination. That is to say, the non-discriminatory price is an “average” of the
discriminatory prices (in this case the harmonic mean). In the remainder of this section we
investigate in more detail when this phenomenon occurs.
First, consider the straightforward case of monopoly supply. Suppose a ﬁrm serves two
markets, 1 and 2, which have independent consumer demands. The ﬁrm’s proﬁt in market
i when it sets the price pi in that market is denoted πi(pi). Then the proﬁt-maximizing
discriminatory prices are characterized by π′
i(pi) = 0, while the proﬁt-maximizing uniform
price   p satisﬁes π′
1(  p) + π′
2(  p) = 0. Except in the ﬂuke case where there is no gain from
discrimination, it follows that in market 1, say, we have π′
1(  p) > 0 and in market 2 π′
2(  p) < 0.
Assuming proﬁt functions are single-peaked it follows that if the ﬁrm can price discriminate
it will raise its price in market 1 (the strong market) and lower its price in market 2.31
29One important issue not discussed here is when a pure strategy equilibrium exists. If some consumers
view the two ﬁrms as very close substitutes then no pure strategy equilibrium exists, as in Varian (1980). If
tL is close to zero the candidate equilibrium price ˆ t is also close to zero, and it will be worthwhile for a ﬁrm to
deviate from the candidate equilibrium, and instead to set a high price which targets the choosier consumers.
For instance, take the special case where there are just two values of t, tL and tH, which are equally likely.
One can show that the candidate equilibrium in expression (6) is an equilibrium when pL/pH > 0.093.
30This example is closely related Proposition 4 (part (i)) in Armstrong and Vickers (2001), specialized to
the case of inelastic demand. Similar eﬀects are seen, in a more extreme way, if the model of “tourists and
locals” in Varian (1980) is extended to allow for price discrimination. Local consumers are assumed to know
the full range of prices oﬀered by the competing ﬁrms and to buy from the lowest price ﬁrm. Tourists are
assumed to know nothing, and randomly choose a ﬁrm. If ﬁrms cannot price discriminate between these two
groups, Varian shows that ﬁrms choose prices according to a mixed strategy. However, if ﬁrms can distinguish
between the two groups, they would charge price equal to marginal cost to the local consumers and price
equal to the reservation value to tourists. Therefore, as in the example in the text, the choosy group (here,
the ignorant group) is treated badly by price discrimination. In Varian’s model, however, industry proﬁt is
unchanged when price discrimination is practiced.
31This discussion has only been about third-degree discrimination. At least in the case of monopoly, the
typical case with other forms of discrimination is also that some prices rise while others fall. For instance,
when a multiproduct ﬁrm practises mixed bundling, in many cases it will choose to raise its prices for
individual purchase, and lower its price for joint purchase, compared to the case where the ﬁrm sets a
separable price for each product. Similarly, if a ﬁrm oﬀers a two-part tariﬀ instead of a linear price, the
typical case is that the overall tariﬀ rises for consumers who buy little but falls for high-volume consumers.
15Matters are more complicated when there are competing ﬁrms, as discussed in Corts
(1998). The chief aspect which diﬀers from monopoly is that a market might be strong
for one ﬁrm but weak for its rival. For now, though, suppose ﬁrms do not diﬀer in their
judgement of which markets are strong. Corts uses the term “best response symmetry” for
such cases.
Suppose there are two markets, 1 and 2, and two ﬁrms, A and B. Suppose there are no




if it sets the price pA
i there while its rival sets the price pB




i ) for ﬁrm A’s proﬁt-maximizing price in market i if its rival sets the price
pB
i . (Similar notation is used for ﬁrm B’s reaction functions.) In reasonable situations these
reaction functions are upward sloping. Suppose that both ﬁrms view market 1, say, as the














See Figure 1 for a depiction of this situation.
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Figure 1: Duopoly Reaction Functions
When ﬁrms can price discriminate, the equilibrium prices in market 1 are at γ on the
ﬁgure, and the prices in market 2 are at α. Now suppose that ﬁrms cannot price discriminate.
16As in the monopoly case just described, if the proﬁt functions are single-peaked, ﬁrm A’s best
response to a uniform price pB from its rival will lie between its pair of reaction functions on
the ﬁgure. Similarly, ﬁrm B’s response function if it cannot discriminate lies between its two
reaction functions. We can deduce that the equilibrium prices when discrimination is not
possible lie inside the diamond aβγδ. In particular, the comparison between discriminatory
and non-discriminatory prices is clear: permitting discrimination increases the prices in
market 1 (the strong market) and decreases the prices in market 2 (the weak market).
3.3 Discriminating on brand preference: best-response asymme-
try
Now return to the speciﬁc Hotelling example, and suppose for simplicity that all consumers
have the same choosiness parameter t.32 Suppose that ﬁrms can observe a consumer’s loca-
tion x and price accordingly. Consider ﬁrm A’s best response to its rival’s price pB
x when




x + t(1 − x) ,
in which case it will oﬀer the limit price that just prevents the consumer from being tempted
by the rival oﬀer pB
x , so that pA
x + tx = pB





x + t(1 − 2x) .
Thus, ﬁrm A prices high to those consumers who prefer its product but prices low to con-
sumers who prefer its rival’s product, so that small x consumers are the “strong market”
for ﬁrm A. Similarly, those consumers who prefer ﬁrm B’s product are that ﬁrm’s strong
market. We deduce that one ﬁrm’s strong market is the other’s weak market. Corts terms
this situation “best-response asymmetry”.






(1 − 2x)t if x ≤ 1
2
(2x − 1)t if x ≥ 1
2
(7)
Consumers will obtain the product from the closer (preferred) ﬁrm, which is eﬃcient, and
those consumers closer to the middle will obtain the best deal (even when account is taken
of their greater transport costs). A ﬁrm will set a a high price to consumers with a strong
brand preference for its product to exploit those consumers’ distaste for the rival’s product.
Suppose next that ﬁrms must set a uniform price to consumers. If consumers are uni-
formly distributed along the interval then the equilibrium uniform price is p = t. This
32This analysis is due to Thisse and Vives (1988).
17uniform price is above all the discriminatory prices in expression (7). Thus, this is an ex-
ample where all prices decrease with price discrimination.33 Price discrimination has no
impact on total welfare since all consumers just wish to buy a single unit, and they buy
this unit from the closer ﬁrm with either pricing regime. All consumers clearly beneﬁt from
price discrimination. Firms, however, make lower proﬁts–in fact, in this example they make
precisely half the proﬁts–when they engage in this form of price discrimination compared
to when they must oﬀer a uniform price.
The fact that ﬁrms might be worse oﬀ when they practice price discrimination is one of
the key diﬀerences between monopoly and competition. Ignoring issues of commitment, a
monopolist is better oﬀ when it can price discriminate: the ﬁrm is free to choose a uniform
price when discrimination is permitted but in general it is better oﬀ setting diﬀerent prices.
In the same way, an oligopolistic ﬁrm is always better oﬀ if it can price discriminate compared
to when it cannot, for given prices oﬀered by its rivals. However, once account is taken of
what rivals too will do, ﬁrms in equilibrium can be worse oﬀ when discrimination is used.
Firms then ﬁnd themselves in a classic prisoner’s dilemma.
A closely related model, which is also useful for understanding models of dynamic price
discrimination in section 5, is by Bester and Petrakis (1996).34 Instead of being able to
condition prices on a consumer’s precise location, here a ﬁrm merely observes whether a
consumer has a brand preference for its product or its rival’s product. That is to say, ﬁrms
observe whether a consumer has location x ≤ 1
2 or location x ≥ 1
2. The authors suppose
that ﬁrms can target diﬀerent prices to consumers in diﬀerent regions by placing targeted
coupons, which promise a discount if the consumer brings the coupon to the store, in diﬀerent
regional newspapers. When consumers are uniformly located along the interval one can show
that the equilibrium discriminatory prices are
ˆ p = 2
3t ; p = 1
3t . (8)
Here, ˆ p is a ﬁrm’s price to a consumer on that ﬁrm’s “turf” (i.e., when the consumer is
known to prefer that ﬁrm) and p is a ﬁrm’s price to a consumer on the rival’s turf. Thus,
each consumer is oﬀered two prices: a low price from the less preferred ﬁrm and a high price
from the preferred ﬁrm. However, as in the Thisse-Vives model, these prices are below the
equilibrium uniform price (which is p = t). Those consumers close to the middle of the
interval, who have little preference for one ﬁrm over the other, will clearly choose the low
price from the (slightly) more distant ﬁrm. This is ineﬃcient, since consumers should buy
from their preferred ﬁrm regardless of prices. However, consumers with a strong preference
for a ﬁrm will buy from that ﬁrm despite the high price. Again, a prisoner’s dilemma
33In this framework it is perfectly possible that some prices increase with discrimination. Suppose that
instead of following a uniform distribution, the density of x on [0,1] is f(x) = 6x(1 − x), a density which
puts more consumers located close to the mid-point. Then one can show that the equilibrium uniform price
is p = 2
3t, which is lower than discriminatory prices for those consumers close to the ends of the interval.
34See also Shaﬀer and Zhang (1995).
18emerges, and both ﬁrms are better oﬀ without this form of price discrimination even though
each would individually like to discriminate.35
Thus, there are competitive situations where price discrimination causes all prices to
fall.36 In such cases, discrimination acts to intensify competition. The analysis in section
3.2 indicates that, at least in the case of third-degree discrimination, this situation can only
occur when ﬁrms diﬀer in their view of which markets are strong and which are weak. In
the early literature on competitive price discrimination it was not always made clear that
the crucial feature that can cause discrimination to intensify competition is best response
asymmetry. For instance, Thisse and Vives (1988, page 134) wrote that “denying a ﬁrm
the right to meet the price of a competitor on a discriminatory basis provides the latter
with some protection against price attacks. The eﬀect is then to weaken competition [...]”
And Anderson and Leruth (1993, page 56) argue that price discrimination reduces proﬁts
since “ﬁrms compete on more fronts”. The example of discrimination based on choosiness
in section 3.2 above, illustrates that it is not the number of fronts on which ﬁrms compete
which is relevant. (In that example, discrimination raises equilibrium proﬁt.) Rather, in the
case of third-degree price discrimination what matters is whether ﬁrms have divergent views
about which markets are strong and which are weak.37
3.4 Private information
Next, consider a variant of the Bester and Petrakis (1996) model where ﬁrms have private
information about consumer brand preferences.38 Perhaps each ﬁrm purchases customer
data from a diﬀerent marketing company, for example. Suppose that if a consumer prefers
ﬁrm A (i.e., she has location parameter x ≤ 1
2), ﬁrm i receives the signal si = sL with
probability α ≥ 1
2 and the signal si = sR with probability 1 − α. Similarly, if a consumer
prefers ﬁrm B then the ﬁrm receives a signal si = sR with probability α and the signal
35Notice that proﬁt with discrimination in the Thisse-Vives model is always lower than that in the Bester-
Petrakis model. Liu and Serfes (2004) propose a model that encompasses these two as extremes. They
show that equilibrium proﬁts are U-shaped in the precision of information about brand preferences: proﬁt is
lowest when the ﬁrms have information which is less precise than the perfect information in the Thisse-Vives
framework.
36Price discrimination might also cause all prices to fall when there is monopoly supply. Nahata, Os-
taszewski, and Sahoo (1990) show that if the proﬁt functions are not single-peaked then all prices might
decrease, or all might increase, when a monopolist engages in third-degree price discrimination. In addition,
as discussed in section 2.2, when a monopolist sells a durable good over time and cannot commit to future
prices, all prices might fall compared to the case where the ﬁrm commits to set the same price over time.
37Nevo and Wolfram (2002) present evidence consistent with the hypothesis that price discrimination
via coupons in the breakfast cereal market exhibits best response asymmetry, and that the introduction of
coupons leads to a fall in all prices. They also document how ﬁrms allegedly colluded to stop the use of
coupons. Odlyzko (2003) discusses how competing railway companies welcomed tariﬀ regulation in order to
avoid proﬁt-destroying price discrimination.
38The discussion of the framework where ﬁrms possess a symmetric private signal is a simpliﬁed version
of the model in chapter 2 of Esteves (2004).
19si = sL with probability 1−α. Conditional on a consumer’s location, the signals sA and sB
are independently distributed. A symmetric equilibrium will consist of a ﬁrm choosing the
price ˆ p for those consumers they believe prefer their product and choosing price p when they
think the consumer is likely to prefer their rival’s product. (Speciﬁcally, if ﬁrm A observes
the signal sA = sL it will set the price ˆ p, while if it sees the other signal it will set the price
p. Firm B will follow the reverse strategy.)







α + 2α2 . (9)
When α > 1
2 it follows that ˆ p > p and ﬁrms charge more to those consumers they consider
likely to have a brand preference for them. When α = 1
2 (i.e., when the signal has no
informational content) it follows that ˆ p = p = t, just as in the standard Hotelling model
without information. When the signal is perfectly accurate, i.e., when α = 1, the prices are as
given in expression (8), just as in the Bester-Petrakis model. More generally, the availability
of the private signal causes both prices to fall compared to the case when the signal is not
available. Finally, one can show that equilibrium industry proﬁt falls monotonically as the
accuracy of the private signal rises.
One can perform the same exercise when signals instead give information about a con-
sumer’s choosiness. In this case, industry proﬁt is increasing in the precision of the signal.
More interesting, though, is to present an asymmetric variant of this model which is suited to
discussing whether a ﬁrm has an incentive to share information with its rival. Suppose there
are two consumer segments: a consumer has choosiness parameter t = tL with probability
1
2 and choosiness parameter t = tH with probability 1
2. Suppose that ﬁrm A knows each
consumer’s choosiness precisely, but ﬁrm B knows nothing. Does A have an incentive to
share its information with its rival? Without information sharing, ﬁrm A sets the two prices,
pA
L and pA
H, respectively to the type-tL and the type-tH consumers, but ﬁrm B is constrained


















One can show that pA
L ≤ pB ≤ pA
H, and so the better-informed ﬁrm has the greater market
share in the price-sensitive market, but the smaller market share in the choosy market.39









39One can also show neither market is cornered by one ﬁrm with these prices. Interestingly, ﬁrm B’s price
is the same as when ﬁrm A is not informed. When neither ﬁrm is informed, expression (6) reveals that each
ﬁrm sets the uniform price 2 tLtH
tL+tH.
20Firm B’s proﬁt in this case is equal to
tLtH
tL+tH. This proﬁt is the same as if ﬁrm A were not
informed. Therefore, in this case, an uninformed ﬁrm is indiﬀerent about whether or not its
rival has the ability to practice price discrimination. Firm A obtains higher proﬁt compared
to the case in which it was not informed.
Suppose now that ﬁrm A shares its information with its rival. (Assume that the ﬁrm
has no scope to distort the information it passes to B.) In this case, both ﬁrms’ equilibrium
prices are pL = tL in the price-sensitive segment and pH = tH in the choosy segment. Firms







One can verify that πA
PUB > πA
PRIV except in the extreme case when tL = tH (in which case
the information has no value). Thus, the well-informed ﬁrm has an incentive to provide its
rival with information (and the rival is willing to accept this information). In this example,
when a ﬁrm is uninformed about consumer choosiness it will price low, and this low price
disadvantages the well-informed ﬁrm.
Finally, we can perform the same exercise for the case where one ﬁrm has information
about consumer brand preference, while its rival does not.40 Speciﬁcally, suppose all con-
sumers have the same choosiness parameter t, and ﬁrm A knows whether x < 1
2 or x > 1
2
while ﬁrm B knows nothing. Suppose ﬁrm A sets the price ˆ pA to those consumers it knows
prefer its product and the price pA to those consumers who prefer B’s product, while ﬁrm
B sets the uniform price pB. Then one can show the equilibrium prices are
p
B = 1













Suppose instead that neither ﬁrm has information. In this case, each ﬁrm sets the uniform
price p = t and makes proﬁt of 1
2t. Therefore, ﬁrm A is actually made worse oﬀ by its
private information about consumer tastes.41 Clearly, if ﬁrm A could secretly obtain this
information (so that ﬁrm B continues to set the price pB = t) then it is made better oﬀ by its
information. However, so long as it is common knowledge that ﬁrm A has this information
(and will surely use it) then ﬁrm A is worse oﬀ once B’s aggressive response is considered. If
ﬁrm A has this information, then it would like to commit not to price discriminate. Another
40See also section III of Thisse and Vives (1988) and section 3 of Chen (2004). These authors assume
that when one ﬁrm chooses to discriminate while the other does not, the non-discriminating ﬁrm acts as a
Stackleberg price leader.
41If ﬁrm A gives ﬁrm B this information, then we are in the Bester-Petrakis situation, and each ﬁrm
will make proﬁt of 5
18t. This means that ﬁrm A’s proﬁts decrease, and so it has no incentive to release its
information to B.
21way to think about this is to suppose that the Bester-Petrakis model is extended to a two-
stage interaction, where ﬁrms ﬁrst (simultaneously) decide whether or not to “invest” in the
technology or information gathering procedures needed to be able to price discriminate, and
in the second stage they choose their price(s). In this two-stage game, one equilibrium is for
neither ﬁrm to choose to be able to price discriminate in the ﬁrst period. Thus, the prisoner’s
dilemma aspect of the Bester-Petrakis model falls away in this dynamic version.42,43
4 The eﬀects of more instruments in oligopoly
4.1 Homogeneous consumers
The model presented in Armstrong and Vickers (2001, section 3) provides one framework in
which to discuss the eﬀects of increasing the range of tariﬀ instruments available to ﬁrms.
Suppose there are two ﬁrms, A and B. Suppose that ﬁrm i’s maximum proﬁt per consumer
is πi(u) when the ﬁrm oﬀers each of its consumers the surplus u. For this function to be well
behaved, assume that ﬁrms have constant-returns-to-scale in serving consumers, so proﬁt
per consumer does not depend on the number of consumers served. Assume consumers are
homogeneous in the sense that the relationship πi(u) is the same for all consumers. Assume
further that consumers choose to purchase all relevant products from one ﬁrm. The shape
of πi(u) embodies the ﬁrm’s cost function, the demand function of consumers, and–most
important for the current purpose–the kinds of tariﬀs the ﬁrm can employ.
If consumers choose their supplier according to a Hotelling speciﬁcation with homoge-










where ui is its chosen consumer surplus and uj is its rival’s consumer surplus. Let   ui denote
the maximum level of consumer surplus that allows ﬁrm i to break even. In most natural
cases, this is the level of consumer surplus associated with marginal-cost pricing, a pricing
42There is also another, lower proﬁt, equilibrium where both ﬁrms choose to be able to discriminate in the
ﬁrst period. Thus, there is a complementarity in the ﬁrms’ decisions about whether to price discriminate,
and a ﬁrm’s incentive to discriminate is higher if its rival also discriminates. A similar feature is seen also
in Ellison (2005).
43A related issue is whether ﬁrms choose to compete in (i) “posted prices” or by (ii) “secret deals”. For
instance, one might envisage a two-stage interaction in which each ﬁrm chooses its pricing strategy in the
ﬁrst stage and then chooses its actual prices in the second stage. With (i) a ﬁrm knows nothing about its
individual consumers and posts a uniform price. With (ii) a ﬁrm might learn about the consumers from the
negotiation process and price accordingly, and moreover the ﬁrm might take the rival’s posted price as given
if the rival chooses strategy (i). Thus, when one ﬁrm chooses (i) and the other chooses (ii), the former acts
as a Stackleberg price leader (as in section III of Thisse and Vives (1988)).
44Note that transport cost is assumed to be a lump-sum cost which does not depend on the quantities
chosen, i.e., it is a “shopping cost” rather than a “shipping cost”.
22policy that is assumed to be feasible for either ﬁrm. Assume ﬁrms are symmetric except
possibly for the range of tariﬀ instruments they employ. This implies that each ﬁrm delivers
the same consumer surplus with marginal-cost pricing, and so   uA =   uB =   u, say. Moreover,
since pricing at marginal cost maximizes total per-consumer surplus (u + πi(u)), it follows
that π′
i(  u) = −1 for each ﬁrm. In sum, it is natural to assume
πA(  u) = πB(  u) = 0 ; π
′
A(  u) = π
′
B(  u) = −1 . (11)
The analysis in Appendix B shows that in competitive markets (t small), ﬁrm i’s equilibrium
consumer surplus (ui), ﬁrm i’s total proﬁt (Πi), and total welfare (W) are approximately:

































A(  u) + π
′′
B(  u)) . (14)
Next, suppose there are two possible proﬁt functions, π( ) and ˆ π( ), where π( ) ≤ ˆ π( ).
Therefore, ˆ π is the proﬁt function when a ﬁrm has access to a wider range of instruments
when designing its tariﬀ compared to the situation associated with proﬁt function π( ).
(For instance, π might be the proﬁt function when a ﬁrm uses linear prices, while ˆ π is
the corresponding proﬁt function when a ﬁrm uses two-part tariﬀs.) Since the two proﬁt
functions satisfy (11) and ˆ π ≥ π, it follows that ˆ π
′′(  u) ≥ π′′(  u), with strict inequality except
in knife-edge cases. Using expressions (12)—(14) we can draw the following conclusions for
competitive markets.
Suppose the market environment changes so that both ﬁrms have access to more instru-
ments in their tariﬀ design. This can be modeled by supposing that both ﬁrms use the proﬁt
function ˆ π( ) instead of π( ). In this case (i) consumer surplus falls, (ii) proﬁt rises, and (iii)
total welfare rises.45 Thus, this model exhibits the same qualitative features as monopoly
ﬁrst-degree price discrimination discussed in section 2.1: the use of more instruments enables
the industry to better extract consumer surplus, which causes proﬁts and welfare to rise but
consumer surplus to decline.
Notice also that there is no prisoner’s dilemma in this setting, and a ﬁrm wishes to use
the more ornate tariﬀ even if its rival does not.46 In sum, in this framework we predict that
45This is part (i) of Proposition 3 in Armstrong and Vickers (2001). For instance, from expression (12)
ui ≈ ¯ u−t− 1
2t2π′′(¯ u) if π( ) is used, but ui ≈ ¯ u−t− 1
2t2ˆ π
′′(¯ u) if ˆ π( ) is used, and so consumers are worse oﬀ
in the latter case. Expression (13) shows the ﬁrms’ beneﬁt from using more ornate tariﬀs is approximately
twice the loss which consumers then suﬀer.
46From expression (13), since ˆ π
′′(¯ u) > π′′(¯ u) it is a dominant strategy for a ﬁrm to use the proﬁt function
ˆ π instead of π. Also, in this case (12) shows that the ﬁrm which uses the more ornate tariﬀ will obtain a
smaller market share in equilibrium.
23ﬁrms will use whichever tariﬀ instruments they can, and the result is that proﬁt and welfare
rise (compared to a situation where less ornate tariﬀs are employed), while consumers suﬀer.
This result seems sometimes to be at odds with casual observation. Firms in many in-
dustries do not use two-part tariﬀs, for instance, even though such tariﬀs could be oﬀered.
(Supermarkets do not generally oﬀer two-part tariﬀs, for example.) That is to say, there
is sometimes too little price discrimination observed compared to what simple theory sug-
gests. Therefore, this model is failing to capture an important aspect of many real-world
markets. One possibility is that consumers have an (“irrational”) aversion to ﬁxed charges,
say, for psychological reasons, which is not captured in the model. Another possibility is
that arbitrage between consumers renders some instruments infeasible. Alternatively, the
presence of substantial consumer heterogeneity might overturn the result, and a ﬁrm might
sometimes be made worse oﬀ by unilaterally choosing to compete with two-part tariﬀs given
the response this induces from its rivals. A fourth aspect of some real-world markets which
this model ignores is that consumers often make purchases from more than one supplier.
This extension is pursued in the next section, where it is seen that the use of more ornate
tariﬀs can depress equilibrium proﬁt.
4.2 Mixed bundling
In addition to the case of discrimination based on brand preference (section 3.3), a sec-
ond important example where price discrimination can intensify competition is competitive
bundling. Consider for instance the two-dimensional Hotelling model presented by Matutes
and Regibeau (1992).47 Two ﬁrms, A and B, each oﬀer their own brand of two products, 1
and 2. Consumers are uniformly distributed on the unit square, and the location (or brand
preferences) of a consumer is denoted (x1,x2) ∈ [0,1]2. Let x1 represent a consumer’s dis-
tance from ﬁrm A’s brand of product 1 and x2 represent a consumer’s distance from the
same ﬁrm’s brand of product 2. Transport cost (or choosiness) is t for both products.
In general, each ﬁrm sets three prices. Let pi
1 denote ﬁrm i’s price for its product 1,
let pi
2 be its price for its product 2, and let pi
12 be its total price when a consumer buys
both of its products. For simplicity, suppose that conditions in the market are such that all
consumers buy both products.48 Then a type-(x1,x2) consumer’s total cost if he buys both
products from ﬁrm A is pA
12 + t(x1 + x2), his total cost if he buys both products from B is
pB
12 +t([1− x1]+[1 −x2]), and his total cost if he buys product i from A and product j  = i
from B is pA
i +pB
j +t(xi +[1−xj]). The consumer will choose the option from among these







(which corresponds to the case where ﬁrms do not charge a premium for joint consumption),
the pattern of demand is shown in Figure 2.
47See Anderson and Leruth (1993) for related analysis using a Logit model of consumer demand.
48This assumption implies that the two products could equally well be taken to be perfect complements,
so that each consumer needs to buy both products if he is to gain any utility, as is assumed in the more
general model with partial consumer participation in Matutes and Regibeau (1992).
24Suppose that production is costless. Consider ﬁrst the case where ﬁrms must choose from
the restrictive set of tariﬀs which do not involve discounts for joint consumption. That is to
say, ﬁrms must choose separable tariﬀs, so that pi
12 ≡ pi
1 + pi
2. In this case ﬁrms compete
product-by-product, and the equilibrium price for each product from each ﬁrm is p = t.
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Figure 2: Pattern of Consumer Demand with Duopoly Bundling
Next suppose ﬁrms can oﬀer tariﬀs involving the additional instrument of discounts for
joint consumption (i.e., ﬁrms can set pi
12  = pi
1 + pi
2). By calculating the areas depicted in
















These prices are uniformly below the equilibrium prices without bundling. A ﬁrm’s equilib-
rium proﬁt with the prices in (15) is π ≈ 0.7 × t, compared to π = t when the bundling
instrument is not used. Similarly to the model in section 3.3, ﬁrms play a prisoner’s dilemma:
given a rival’s prices, a ﬁrm is always better oﬀ if it has the ﬂexibility to engage in mixed
bundling, but in equilibrium proﬁt is reduced when this extra instrument is used by both
ﬁrms.
As discussed in section 3.4, in some circumstances it is natural to model the ﬁrms’ in-
teraction as a two-stage game, where ﬁrms ﬁrst decide whether to compete using separable
25prices or using mixed bundling, and then in the second stage they choose their prices. Sup-
pose in the second stage of this interaction that ﬁrm A can practice mixed bundling whereas
















Firm A’s equilibrium proﬁt in this case is approximately 0.82×t, while ﬁrm B’s proﬁt is 3
4t.
Recall that if neither ﬁrm chooses to compete with mixed bundling each will make proﬁt t.
Therefore, in the ﬁrst stage a ﬁrm has no incentive unilaterally to price discriminate in this
manner if its rival does not. Moreover, even if its rival chooses to bundle, it is still in a ﬁrm’s
interest to choose not to bundle. Therefore, in this extended two-stage game it is no longer
an equilibrium to practice bundling, and it is a dominant strategy for a ﬁrm to commit to
price its products separably.49
When this two-stage interaction is not the natural model for the market, however, equi-
librium prices are given in expression (15). Consumers with strong tastes for one ﬁrm’s
product (in the top quartile) and strong tastes for the rival ﬁrm’s other product (in the top
quartile) will buy one product from each ﬁrm. Clearly, all consumers are better oﬀ as a re-
sult of the price reductions caused by price discrimination. However, there is excessive joint
consumption (or one-stop shopping): too many consumers buy both products from the same
ﬁrm than is eﬃcient, and welfare falls with this form of discrimination. These are exactly the
opposite comparative statics to those obtained in the exclusively one-stop shopping model
described in section 4.1.
The economic reason why bundling depresses proﬁt is not easy to come by. (It cannot be
anything to do with “best response asymmetry” since diﬀerent ﬁrms do not view the various
kinds of consumer as being strong or weak in diﬀerent ways.) Some intuition is available if
one restricts attention to a choice between separable pricing and pure bundling.50 Suppose
consumer preferences are as described above. As before, if ﬁrms compete with separable
prices then they compete product-by-product and each ﬁrm makes proﬁt t. Alternatively, if
ﬁrms bundle their products together then a type-(x1,x2) consumer will buy from ﬁrm A if
p
A
12 + t(x1 + x2) ≤ p
B
12 + t([1 − x1] + [1 − x2]) ,
where pi
12 is the price for ﬁrm i’s bundle. One can then show that the equilibrium bundled
price is pA
12 = pB
12 = t, and ﬁrms each make proﬁts of just 1
2t. Thus, with pure bundling the
49Gans and King (2005) consider a variant of this model, where there are four separate ﬁrms each oﬀering
one of the four product variants. They show that it can be proﬁtable for two ﬁrms to agree to set a discount
for joint purchase of their two products. (The authors assume that the two ﬁrms commit to the size of the
discount, which they agree to fund equally, and subsequently set their prices non-cooperatively.) If both
pairs of ﬁrms do this, then there is no eﬀect on proﬁt compared to the case where neither pair of ﬁrms oﬀers
bundling discounts (although there is again socially excessive bundling in this case).
50See Matutes and Regibeau (1988), Economides (1989), and Nalebuﬀ (2000) for this analysis.
26industry proﬁt halves. Why is this? Equilibrium prices are determined as a balance between
building market share and exploiting infra-marginal consumers. If there are many marginal
consumers compared to consumers overall (as is the case with homogeneous consumers), then
equilibrium prices are close to cost. The crucial point here is that there is a greater number
of marginal consumers when ﬁrms compete in bundles. (Geometrically, with bundling the
marginal consumers lie along the diagonal of the square, with length
√
2, whereas with
separable prices the marginal consumers lie along a line of length 1.) This eﬀect–that
bundling has a “homogenizing” eﬀect on consumer valuations–is essentially the same as
discussed in the monopoly context of section 2.1. With monopoly, when consumers become
more homogeneous because of bundling, the ﬁrm can extract more consumer surplus. With
competition, though, when bundling makes consumers more homogeneous this leads to more
aggressive competition and low prices.51,52
4.3 Third-degree price discrimination
This section discusses the asymmetric situation in which a ﬁrm which operates in several
markets faces a rival which is (potentially) active in just one market.53 Price discrimina-
tion can enable a multi-market ﬁrm to target price cuts selectively in those markets where
competition is present. The ability to make selective price cuts is therefore likely to have an
adverse eﬀect on a single-market ﬁrm’s proﬁts.
To see this formally, suppose ﬁrm A serves two independent markets, 1 and 2. Market
1 is monopolized by ﬁrm A, whereas in market 2 there is a rival ﬁrm B. Firm A’s (linear)
prices in the two markets are pA
1 and pA
2 , while ﬁrm B’s price in market 2 is pB
2 . In market
1, ﬁrm A’s proﬁt function is π1(pA
1 ) whereas in market 2 the ﬁrm’s proﬁt function given its
rival’s price is πA
2 (pA
2 ,pB
2 ). Similarly, ﬁrm B’s proﬁt function is πB
2 (pA
2 ,pB
2 ). If ﬁrm A can
price discriminate, in the sense that it may set diﬀerent prices in the two markets, it will set
the monopoly price pM
1 in market 1 (where this price maximizes π1( )) and in market 2 prices
51Nalebuﬀ (2000) shows that as the number of products which can be bundled becomes large, the proﬁt
obtained with pure bundling become an ever smaller proportion of the proﬁt obtained with separable pricing.
52The fact that (pure) bundling can make ﬁrms price aggressively appears in a diﬀerent context in Whinston
(1990). There, a multiproduct ﬁrm faces competition from a single-product rival. In certain conditions, when
the multiproduct ﬁrm commits to bundle its products together before prices are chosen, it will choose a lower
eﬀective price in the rival’s market compared to when it prices its products separably. Therefore, in some
circumstances a commitment to bundle can act to deter single-product entry. (See section 4.3 for a related
model in a more conventional price discrimination framework.) In other circumstances, however, when the
multiproduct ﬁrm commits to bundle its products, this can act to relax subsequent competition with a
single-product rival. See Carbajo, De Meza, and Seidman (1990), Whinston (1990), Chen (1997a), and
section III.E of Nalebuﬀ (2004) for further details. In such cases, an incumbent might wish to commit to
prices its products separably to convince potential entrants that it will be aggressive in the event of entry.
53This discussion is loosely based on Armstrong and Vickers (1993). That paper also argues that the eﬀect
of allowing price discrimination on the aggressiveness of competition is exacerbated when the multi-product
ﬁrm is regulated and operates under an average-price constraint. (If it reduces its price in the competitive
market it is then allowed to raise its price in the captive market.)








2 ) be ﬁrm B’s best response to A’s price. These two reaction functions are
depicted on Figure 3, and the equilibrium prices in market 2 are at the point β on the ﬁgure.
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Figure 3: The Eﬀect of Banning Price Discrimination
Next suppose that ﬁrm A cannot set diﬀerent prices in the two markets. Suppose further
that for all relevant prices set by B, ﬁrm A prefers to set a higher price in the monopoly
market than in the competitive market, so that pM
1 > RA
2 (pB
2 ). In other words, the captive
market is ﬁrm A’s strong market, which seems plausible in a wide variety of contexts. Then,
with single-peak assumptions on ﬁrm A’s proﬁt functions, it follows that when it must set a
common price in the two markets, ﬁrm A’s best-response to its rival’s price, RA
ND(pB
2 ) say,
is shifted upwards, so that RA
ND(pB
2 ) > RA
2 (pB
2 ). (See Figure 3.) It follows that the market
2 prices when price discrimination is permitted are all lower than the corresponding prices
when A must set a uniform price (denoted by γ on the ﬁgure). Therefore, the eﬀect of a ban
on price discrimination is to reduce the price in the captive market, and to raise both prices
in the competitive market. The proﬁt of the single-market rival clearly increases with such
a ban, while the eﬀect on ﬁrm A’s overall proﬁt is not clear-cut in general.54
54Dobson and Waterson (2005) present a related model where a national retailer operates in a number
28Of course, this has implications for the rival’s decision about whether to enter the market.
If the entrant has a ﬁxed cost of entry, it will enter only if it expects its post-entry proﬁt to
cover its entry cost. There are then three cases to consider. If the entry cost is large, entry
will not take place regardless of whether the incumbent can price discriminate. In this case,
the social desirability of price discrimination is exactly as in the standard monopoly case
(which is ambiguous in general). Similarly, if the entry cost is very small, then entry will
take place regardless of policy towards price discrimination. The interesting case is when the
cost of entry lies in the intermediate range where entry is proﬁtable only if the incumbent
is not permitted to discriminate. In such cases, a ban on price discrimination acts to induce
entry.55 In such cases it is plausible that a ban on price discrimination will cause prices in
both markets to fall: if discrimination is possible, there will be no entry and the incumbent
will charge monopoly prices in each market; if the incumbent must charge a common price
in the two markets, then this will bring in the entrant, and this will bring both prices down
from monopoly levels.
The general principle, as in the Thisse-Vives quote in section 3.3, is that denying an
incumbent the right to meet the price of a competitor on a discriminatory basis provides
the latter with some protection against price attacks. While the eﬀect of a ban on price
discrimination is indeed to weaken competition if the entrant is already in the market, once
the ex ante incentives to enterare considered, the eﬀect of a ban on price discrimination might
actually be pro-competitive. However, the welfare eﬀects of a ban on price discrimination
in this context are not clear cut. For instance, since the incumbent is reluctant to cut its
proﬁts in the captive market by meeting its rival’s price in the competitive market, even a
highly ineﬃcient entrant might prosper. While preventing an incumbent from engaging in
selective price cuts is likely to be a powerful means with which to assist entry, as with many
forms of entry assistance the danger of ineﬃcient entry is never far away.56
5 Dynamic pricing and revealed preference in oligopoly
This section extends the discussion of behaviour-based price discrimination in section 2.2 to
competitive situations. Two models are presented, and in each model ﬁrms learn about a
consumer’s relative preference for the ﬁrms’ future oﬀerings from a consumer’s initial choice
of ﬁrm. In the ﬁrst model, consumers have a stable brand preference for one of the two ﬁrms.
If a consumer buys from ﬁrm A in the ﬁrst period, she will most likely prefer to buy from
ﬁrm A in the second period as well, all else equal, and both ﬁrms will price accordingly. In
of markets, in some of which it is the sole supplier and in the remainder of which it faces a single local
competitor. They show that it is possible for the chain store to beneﬁt if it commits to a national pricing
policy (i.e., it does not price diﬀerently depending on competitive markets in each local market).
55Armstrong and Vickers (1993) present a model where the entrant can choose its scale of entry, and we
show that a ban on discrimination will cause the entrant to increase its scale of entry.
56See section 2.2 of Vickers (2005) for an account of the recent theory and policy towards selective price
cuts.
29the second model, consumers initially view the two ﬁrms as perfect substitutes, but in the
second period they incur a switching cost if they wish to change supplier. In each model,
the second period closely resembles the static model of Bester and Petrakis (1996) discussed
in section 3.3: when price discrimination is permitted ﬁrms will price low to “poach” their
rival’s previous customers and price high to their own previous customers. Each ﬁrm regards
its previous customers as its strong market, and there is “best response asymmetry” in the
terminology of Corts (1998). Therefore, the models will share the feature the second-period
prices are all lower than they would be if behaviour-based discrimination were not feasible.
Stable brand preferences
First, consider Fudenberg and Tirole (2000)’s model with stable brand preferences. Sup-
pose there are two periods, and consumers wish to buy a single unit from one of two ﬁrms
(A and B) in each of the two periods. Consumer preferences are as speciﬁed in the Hotelling
framework, and a consumer located at x ∈ [0,1] incurs total cost pA + tx if she buys from
ﬁrm A at the price pA and she incurs total cost pB + t(1 − x) if she buys the unit from B
at the price pB. Assume that a consumer’s brand preference parameter x is the same in the
two periods.
Suppose that ﬁrms cannot commit to future prices, in which case the model is analyzed
by working back from period 2. In the second period we have, in general, an asymmetric
version of the Bester and Petrakis (1996) model. Speciﬁcally, suppose ﬁrm A managed to
attract a fraction 1
2 + γ of consumers in the ﬁrst period. That is to say, ﬁrm A’s turf is the
interval [0, 1
2 + γ], while ﬁrm B’s turf is the remaining [1
2 + γ,1]. For simplicity, suppose
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B
2 = 1
3t(1 + 4γ) . (16)




3t(1 − γ) ; p
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2 = 1
3t(1 − 4γ) . (17)
These prices generalize expression (8) above.58 Thus, the larger “turf” has the higher prices,
which implies that, all else equal, a sophisticated consumer would prefer to purchase from
the ﬁrm with fewer consumers in the ﬁrst period. Perhaps surprisingly, with these prices
















57For these prices to be valid the initial market shares cannot be too asymmetric, and we require that
−1
4 ≤ γ ≤ 1
4. For more asymmetric market shares, the ﬁrm with the larger share will set a price of zero to
its distant market.
58Notice that in very asymmetric situations, where one ﬁrm has more than two-thirds of the ﬁrst-period
consumers, the smaller ﬁrm sets a higher price on its rival’s turf than on its own. Related issues are explored
in Shaﬀer and Zhang (2000).
30Thus, each ﬁrm’s second-period proﬁt is minimized when ﬁrms share the ﬁrst-period market
equally. Intuitively, an equal initial market share generates the most informative outcome
in the second period, and, in this setting with best-response asymmetry, more information
destroys proﬁt. When initial market shares are very asymmetric, on the other hand, little is
learned about (most) consumers’ brand preferences.59
Consider next the choice of ﬁrst-period prices. Here, the outcome depends on the so-
phistication of consumers. Suppose ﬁrst that consumers are sophisticated, and anticipate
the eﬀect of initial market share on future prices in expressions (16)—(17). When both ﬁrms
choose the same initial price p1 say, they will share the market equally in the ﬁrst period
(so γ = 0). Suppose instead that ﬁrm A slightly undercuts its rival in the ﬁrst period, and
chooses price p1− ε. How many more consumers will it attract in the ﬁrst period? Let us say
that the marginal consumer in period 1 is located at x = 1
2 + γ. When a consumer lies near
the midpoint between the two ﬁrms (γ small), she will surely switch ﬁrms in the second pe-
riod in order to take advantage of the poaching discount. Therefore, the marginal consumer
is indiﬀerent between buying from A-then-B or from B-then-A. Given the second-period
prices in (16)—(17), γ satisﬁes
p1 − ε + (1
2 + γ)t + δ
 
1
3t(1 + 4γ) + (1
2 − γ)t
 
= p1 + (1
2 − γ)t + δ
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The key insight is that sophisticated consumers react less sensitively to price reductions
in the ﬁrst period than they would in a static model of this kind (when we would have
γ = ε/(2t)). The reason for this is that if a ﬁrm cuts its price in the ﬁrst period, that
brings a direct beneﬁt to a consumer in the ﬁrst period, but a disadvantage to the marginal
consumer at that ﬁrm in the second period, since her “poaching” price is raised. It follows
that the equilibrium ﬁrst-period price is60
p1 = t(1 + 1
3δ) (18)
while the second-period prices are as in (8) above:
p2 = 1
3t ; ˆ p2 = 2
3t . (19)
59This is especially clear in the variant of the Fudenberg-Tirole model presented in chapter 3 of Esteves
(2004). Esteves assumes that consumer preferences are determined by a binary distribution, and half of
consumers prefer A by a ﬁxed amount and half of consumers prefer B by the same ﬁxed amount. If ﬁrms
set similar prices in the ﬁrst period, they will share the market and consumer tastes are fully revealed in the
second period. If ﬁrms set signiﬁcantly diﬀerent ﬁrst-period prices then one ﬁrm attracts all consumers, and
so nothing is learned in the second period and subsequent proﬁt is high.
60In fact, if a ﬁrm undercuts it rival in the ﬁrst period this will aﬀect the ﬁrm’s equilibrium proﬁts in the
second period (which will rise). However, this eﬀect is second-order for small deviations, at least for this
particular example, and so it plays no role in the calculation of the equilibrium ﬁrst-period price.
31These second-period prices imply that the middle third of consumers switch ﬁrms in the
second period.
The sophisticated reasoning of the consumers in this model when there is behaviour-
based discrimination might sometimes be thought implausible, especially in new markets
when consumers have not yet grasped ﬁrms’ pricing incentives. Suppose instead consumers
are naive and do not foresee that when they buy from the larger ﬁrm in the ﬁrst period they
will face higher prices in the second period. Then, competition in the ﬁrst period is just as
in a standard static model, and the price-period price is p1 = t. Second-period prices are
unaﬀected. Therefore, in this model, if consumers are naive (or myopic) this improves their
position compared to when they are fully strategic. By contrast, in the monopoly situation
of section 2.2, when consumers are naive they are treated less favourably.
If the instrument of behaviour-based price discrimination is not available, a ﬁrm’s price
in each period is p1 = p2 = ˆ p2 = t. This implies that the ﬁrst-period price is reduced
(or unchanged with naive consumers) while second-period prices are raised compared to
the situation with discrimination. Just as with the Bester-Petrakis model, behaviour-based
price discrimination is socially ineﬃcient, since in the second period a third of consumers
buy from the less-preferred ﬁrm.61 When consumers are sophisticated, equilibrium proﬁt is
(slightly) lower with discrimination.62 (When consumers are naive, ﬁrms are even worse oﬀ
with discrimination.) Therefore, when ﬁrms cannot commit to future prices, the ability to
engage in behaviour-based price discrimination reduces their proﬁt. Consumers in aggregate
are better oﬀ with discrimination.63 (If consumers were naive, though, they would be even
better oﬀ with discrimination.) In sum, a ban on this form of price discrimination would
make consumers worse oﬀ, regardless of their presumed sophistication.64 (By contrast, in
the monopoly analysis of section 2.2, a ban on discrimination would make naive consumers
worse oﬀ but sophisticated consumers better oﬀ.)
What happens instead if ﬁrms can commit fully to future prices? That is to say, at the
start of period 1, each ﬁrm i announces its three prices pi
1,pi
2 and ˆ pi
2, where pi
1 is its price
for a unit in the ﬁrst period, pi
2 is the (poaching) price for a unit in the second period if
61As ever, one should be wary of reaching policy conclusions on the basis of these unit demand models
since prices have little role to play in welfare terms. If consumers had elastic multi-unit demands in each
period, the price reductions in the second period (as well as the high prices in the ﬁrst period) would have
a welfare impact.
62Industry proﬁt with discrimination is (1 + 8
9δ)t and without discrimination it is (1 + δ)t.
63With no discrimination, consumers pay a total discounted charge (1 + δ)t for the two units. With
discrimination, a consumer can buy a unit from the same ﬁrm in each period, in which case expressions
(18)—(19) imply the total discounted charge is less than (1 + δ)t, and so all consumers are better oﬀ with
price discrimination.
64Villas-Boas (1999) presents related analysis when long-lived ﬁrms face overlapping generations of short-
lived consumers. One important diﬀerence with the Fudenberg-Tirole model is that a ﬁrm only knows
whether or not a consumer has previous purchased from it, and cannot distinguish between its rival’s previous
consumer and consumers who are new to the market. He ﬁnds that, at least for patient ﬁrms and consumers,
behaviour-based discrimination causes all prices to fall.
32the consumer did not purchase from i in the ﬁrst period, and ˆ pi
2 is the ﬁrm’s second-period
price to repeat buyers.65 One equilibrium of this game is for ﬁrms to oﬀer pure bundling
contracts. Speciﬁcally, in return for an up-front fee (1+δ)t, any consumer can obtain one unit
in period 1 and one unit in period 2 from the ﬁrm. (This implements the same outcome as
the static Hotelling equilibrium, where price is equal to t, duplicated for two periods.) If one
ﬁrm oﬀers this pure bundling contract, its rival’s best response is to oﬀer the same contract.
Thus, if ﬁrms can commit to their prices, the result is the same as when behaviour-based
price discrimination is not possible. (The same result is true for monopoly.)
Changing brand preferences
The discussion so far has not considered the possibility that brand preferences change over
time. If preferences change over time, then even with the ability to commit to future prices,
ﬁrms will generally have an incentive to practice behaviour-based price discrimination. If
consumers know their future preferences at the time of their initial choice of ﬁrm, and ﬁrms
can commit to future prices, the model of Matutes and Regibeau (1992), discussed in section
4.2, applies immediately. If brand preferences for the two ﬁrms are independently distributed
over time (and follow the uniform distribution), behaviour-based price discrimination causes
all prices to fall compared to the case when ﬁrms cannot make their second-period prices
depend on whether the consumer purchased from them in the ﬁrst period.66 This is clearly
beneﬁcial for consumers, although social welfare is reduced since there is excessive joint
consumption. This provides an interesting contrast to the Fudenberg-Tirole model–in which
brand preferences are stable but where ﬁrms cannot commit to future prices–where there is
excessive switching between ﬁrms. The Matutes-Regibeau framework, where ﬁrms commit
to rewards for consumer loyalty, seems broadly applicable to frequent ﬂyer programmes and
the like.67
Switching costs
Next consider Chen (1997b)’s model of switching costs. Again, there are two ﬁrms each
selling a product over two periods and consumers wish to purchase a single unit in each
of the two periods. If a consumer wishes to change supplier in the second period, suppose
65Section 5 of Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) analyzes the use of long-term contracts but without full
commitment. (Firms have the opportunity to poach their rival’s customers in the second period at prices
that are determined only in the second period.) They show in the uniform example that, compared to when
only short-term contracts are employed, the use of long-term contracts reduces proﬁt, reduces switching
(which improves eﬃciency) and boosts consumer surplus.
66Prices are as given in expression (15), and so a repeat buyer receives a discount of 1
2t on her second unit.
67For related analysis in the case where consumers do not know their future preferences at the time of the
initial choice, see Caminal and Matutes (1990) and section 6 of Fudenberg and Tirole (2000). See Kim, Shi,
and Srinivasan (2001) for a recent analysis of reward programs as a price discrimination device to segment
the high-volume and low-volume markets. This paper also shows that ﬁrms might commit to use ineﬃcient
reward schemes (e.g., free gifts instead of price reductions), since that can sometimes act to soften subsequent
price competition.
33she must incur a switching cost s. This cost varies across consumers, and suppose that s is
uniformly distributed on the interval [0,t]. Thus, if ﬁrm A sets the second-period price ˆ pA
2
to its ﬁrst-period customers, and if ﬁrm B sets the poaching price pB
2 to the same group of
customers, a customer will switch to B whenever ˆ pA
2 > pB
2 + s. If ﬁrms can discriminate in
the second period, it is straightforward to show that the equilibrium prices are just as in the
brand loyalty model in (19). (These are the prices regardless of market shares in the ﬁrst
period.) Just as in the Fudenberg-Tirole model, a third of consumers switch suppliers in the
second period, which is ineﬃcient. If the total number of consumers is normalized to 1, and
if the number of ﬁrm A’s ﬁrst-period customers is denoted nA (and the number of ﬁrm B’s
customers is nB = 1 − nA), then ﬁrm A’s second-period proﬁt is68
2
3n






Next, consider the equilibrium ﬁrst-period price. Since second-period prices are same for
the two ﬁrms, a consumer will just choose her initial supplier on the basis of the lowest price.
Since each ﬁrst-period consumer brings with her a second-period proﬁt of 1
3t (see expression
(20)) which is discounted by δ, the equilibrium ﬁrst-period price is p1 = −1
3δt, which is
below cost. This feature is common in models of switching costs, where ﬁrms compete hard
to attract new consumers anticipating that consumers will generate high proﬁt subsequently.
Therefore, we see a major diﬀerence between the two models of Fudenberg-Tirole and Chen:
in the former, prices start high and then decrease, whereas here the reverse is seen.
Next, consider the situation where ﬁrms must charge a uniform price in the second period.
Now, in contrast to the case of price discrimination, the equilibrium second-period prices
will depend on initial market shares. If ﬁrms divide the market equally in the ﬁrst period,
the equilibrium price in the second period is p2 = t. If ﬁrms have diﬀerent market shares in
the ﬁrst period, the larger ﬁrm will choose the higher price in the second period since it has
a greater number of “captive” consumers. More precisely, as shown by Chen, uniform prices





3nA t ; p
B =
2 − nA
3nA t ≤ p
A .
Both prices here are lower compared to when ﬁrms share the market equally (nA = 1
2).
Thus, second-period competition is intensiﬁed when ﬁrms have asymmetric initial market
shares.69 Therefore, in the ﬁrst period, sophisticated consumers will not react sensitively to
price reductions since they know that if they buy from the larger ﬁrm they will face a higher
price in the second period. (Somewhat confusingly, this is the same mechanism as occurs
68Thus, in contrast to the Fudenberg-Tirole model, here the ﬁrm with the larger initial market share makes
a higher proﬁt in the second period compared to its rival.






9nA . Thus, the ﬁrm with the
larger market share obtains higher second-period proﬁt. However, the proﬁt of both ﬁrms is decreasing in
the larger ﬁrm’s market share and both ﬁrms are better oﬀ if they share the ﬁrst-period market equally.
34in the Fudenberg-Tirole model with price discrimination.) As a result, relatively high prices
can be sustained in equilibrium in the ﬁrst period.70 Chen shows that ﬁrms are always better
oﬀ when behaviour-based price discrimination is not possible, and it is ambiguous whether
consumers are better or worse oﬀ.71,72
6 Concluding comments
This paper has surveyed the recent literature on price discrimination, with a focus on eﬀects
on industry outcomes when ﬁrms: (i) have access to more information about their potential
customers; (ii) can use more instruments when choosing their tariﬀs; and (iii) cannot commit
to their pricing policy. The paper argued that the importance of each of these three factors
has been increased due to developments in marketing and e-commerce. The analysis reported
here is more suggestive than deﬁnitive, and was largely presented through a series of worked
examples. (Many of the papers from this analysis was taken share this feature.) There is
plenty more work to be done in this exciting area.
70There are technical complexities in the model, in that there are multiple symmetric ﬁrst-period prices that
can be equilibria. Some of these prices can be below cost, just like in the situation with price discrimination.
Take for instance the situation where consumers are naive (which is not considered by Chen), and in the ﬁrst
period consumers simply buy from the ﬁrm with the lower price (and the initial market is equally divided if
the ﬁrms choose the same initial price). Then if a ﬁrm undercuts its rival in the ﬁrst period it will attract
all consumers and so make less proﬁt in the second period (see the previous footnote). Similarly, if a ﬁrm
sets a negative price in the ﬁrst period, its rival may be unwilling to choose a higher price, because if it does
so it will lose all its initial consumers and so make small proﬁts in the second period. One can show that
any initial price p1 in the range −7
9δt ≤ p1 ≤ 1
9δt can be a symmetric equilibrium.
71See Taylor (2003) for an extension to Chen’s analysis in a number of important directions, for instance
to more than two periods and more than two ﬁrms. When there are more than two periods, the fact that a
consumer switched supplier in the second period indicates that the consumer has low switching costs, and
this could generate more intense competition for him in future periods.
72Asplund, Erikkson, and Strand (2004) show that newspaper subscriptions in local Swedish markets are
more frequently sold at (perhaps introductory) discounts in duopoly regions than in monopoly regions, and
they argue that this is suggestive of customer poaching.
35TECHNICAL APPENDIX
A Private information
Here, the equilibrium prices in expression (9) are derived. Suppose that ﬁrm B sets the price
ˆ p when it sees the signal sR and the price p when it sees the signal sL. First consider the
case when ﬁrm A sees the signal sA = sL for a consumer. What price should ﬁrm A oﬀer
this consumer? There are four relevant events: (i) the consumer is near to ﬁrm A and the
rival ﬁrm also receives the signal sB = sL and so sets the price p; (ii) the consumer is near
to ﬁrm A but the rival ﬁrm receives the ‘wrong’ signal sB = sR and so sets the high price
ˆ p; (iii) the consumer is far from A and the rival ﬁrm also receives the signal sB = sL and so
sets the price p, and (iv) the consumer is far from A and the rival ﬁrm receives the ‘correct’
signal sB = sR and so sets the price ˆ p. Conditional on ﬁrm A seeing the signal sA = sL, the
respective probabilities of the four events are α2,α(1 − α),(1 − α)2,α(1 − α). If ﬁrm A sets




p − ˆ q
t
) + α(1 − α) + α(1 − α)
ˆ p − ˆ q
t
.
(With case (ii) ﬁrm A will surely make the sale whenever it sets a price ˆ q ≤ ˆ p; with case (iii)
it will surely not make the sale when ˆ q ≥ p.)
Suppose next that ﬁrm A observes signal sA = sR. In the same way, if it sets the price q
(which lies in the range p ≤ q ≤ ˆ p) its probability of making the sale is
α
2 ˆ p − q
t
+ α(1 − α)(1 +
p − q
t
) + (1 − α)
2 .
One can then show that symmetric equilibrium prices are given by expression (9).
B Eﬀect of more instruments
Here, the results reported in section 4.1 are derived. Let πA(u) and πB(u) be two proﬁt-as-a-
function-of-utility functions which satisfy (11). Firm i will choose ui to maximize expression
(10), and so equilibrium utilities {ˆ uA(t), ˆ uB(t)} satisfy the ﬁrst-order conditions
πi(ˆ ui(t)) + (t + ˆ ui(t) − ˆ uj(t))π
′
i(ˆ ui(t)) , (21)
where ˆ ui(t) denotes the equilibrium utility oﬀered by ﬁrm i when transport cost is t. We wish
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36Setting t = 0 here yields ˆ u′
A(0) = ˆ u′
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When t = 0 this simpliﬁes to
ˆ u
′′
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which leads to expression (12).
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i(  u))t .
Aggregate consumer surplus in equilibrium is approximately equal to








A(  u) + π
′′
B(  u)) . (22)
The per-consumer proﬁt for ﬁrm i is















Therefore, the total proﬁt of ﬁrm i (i.e., ni ×πi) is given by expression (13). Industry proﬁt
is therefore





A(  u) + π
′′
B(  u)) .
Finally, from (22), total welfare (W = Π + U) is given by expression (14).
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